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The Difference Between Safety and Resilience
Although there are several different definitions of safety, they all tend to emphasize the im-
portance of avoiding unwanted outcomes (losses, harm, incidents, accidents). The  common 
understanding is furthermore that a higher level of safety corresponds to fewer adverse out-
comes – and vice versa. Two illustrations follow:
The International  Civil  Aviation Organisation (ICAO) defines safety as ‘the state in 
which the risk of harm to persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained 
at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard identification 
and risk management.’ 
The Patient Safety Indicator guide published by the US AHQR (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality) defines safety as ‘freedom from accidental injury,’ or ‘avoiding 
injuries or harm to patients from care that is intended to help them.’
There is, however, more to safety than avoiding that things go wrong or reducing the number 
of adverse events. Resilience Engineering argues that it is necessary to focus on what can go 
right (successes) as well as on what can go wrong (failures). A resilient organisation can re-
cognise when day-to-day operations are at the margins of expected performance and safety, 
and is able to adjust practice to return the organisation to a less precarious level of function-
ing. As a practical discipline, Resilience Engineering looks for ways to enhance the ability of 
an organisation to continue to function in as many different situations as possible. Safety is 
consequently defined as the ability to  succeed under varying conditions, rather than as the 
ability to avoid unwanted outcomes. The more formal definition is that:
Resilience is the intrinsic ability of a system or an organisation to adjust its functioning 
prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain required 
operations under both expected and unexpected conditions.
If an organisation is resilient, then it is also safe. This follows from the simple fact that it is 
impossible for something to go right and wrong – to succeed and to fail – at the same time. If 
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the number of things that go right increase, then the number of things that go wrong will con-
sequently decrease. The opposite is, however, not true, i.e., an organisation that is safe is not 
necessarily resilient.
The Four Essential Abilities of Resilience
So what does an organisation need to be resilient? Resilience Engineering emphasizes that 
resilience, and therefore also safety, is something an organisation does, rather than something 
an  organisation  has.  Resilience  Engineering  thus  emphasizes  function  over  structure  and 
ability over capacity. In order to be resilient, an organisation must be able to do certain things, 
which can be expressed practically by four basic abilities.
The Ability to Respond
A  resilient  organisation  must  be  able  to  respond to  regular  and  irregular  variability, 
disturbances, and opportunities. A resilient organisation must know what to do and when to 
do it. This is the ability to address the actual.
• No system,  organisation,  or  organism can  exist  unless  it  is  able  to  respond  to  what 
happens – whether that is a threat or an opportunity. Responses must furthermore be both 
timely and effective so that they can bring about the desired outcomes or changes before 
it is too late. In order to respond, the organisation must be able to detect that something 
has happened and to  recognise  it  and  rate  it  as being so important that a response is 
necessary;  it  must  know  how  and  when to  respond, and  finally  have  the  resources 
necessary to implement the response. 
The Ability to Monitor
A  resilient  organisation  must  be  able  to  monitor  that  which  happens,  and  recognise  if 
something changes so much that it may affect the organisation’s ability to carry out current or 
intended operations. A resilient organisation must know what to focus on – at least for the 
duration of the current activity or operation. This is the ability to address the critical. 
• In order to survive in the long run, an organisation must be able flexibly to monitor both 
its own performance and developments in the environment, and address potential near-
term threats  and opportunities  before they become real.  Monitoring must be based on 
valid  leading indicators,  i.e.,  reliable  precursors  for  events  that  are  about  to  happen. 
(Monitoring cannot be based on lagging indicators, since these by definition are known 
only after the fact.) Their effectiveness depends on how easy it is to interpret them, which 
in turn requires a good understanding of how the organisation functions. In the absence of 
that, ‘leading’ indicators are often defined by association or spurious correlations.
The Ability to Anticipate
A resilient organisation must be able to anticipate developments that lie further into the future, 
beyond the range of current operations. It must be able to consider the possible future events, 
conditions,  or state  changes that  may affect  the organisation’s ability  to function – either 
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positively or negatively – such as technological innovation, changes in customer needs, new 
legislation, etc. This is the ability to address the potential.
• Dealing  with the  potential  goes  beyond conventional  risk assessment.  It  is  not  just  a 
question  of  what  could  go  wrong  in  an  organisation  (hazards,  wrong  decisions, 
technological  failures,  etc.)  or  in  the  immediate  environment  (raw materials,  energy, 
suppliers,  communication,  etc.).  Dealing  with  the  potential  must  also  consider  the 
organisation’s environment in a wider sense such as changes to demands and resources or 
changes  to  constraints  and  opportunities.  In  order  to  envisage  or  imagine  these,  it  is 
necessary to have an articulated understanding (or model) of the organisation and of the 
environment  in  which  it  must  function  and  survive.  To  deal  with  the  potential  it  is 
necessary to acknowledge that the future is uncertain and be willing to bet on new ways 
of thinking.
The Ability to Learn
A resilient  organisation  must  finally  be able  to  learn  from experience.  It  is  necessary  to 
understand  what  has  happened,  and  be  able  to  learn  the  right  lessons  from  the  right 
experience. This is the ability to address the factual.
• Future performance can only be improved if there is a change in behaviour as a result of 
experience. In order to learn, it is necessary that there are frequent opportunities to learn, 
that  events  have  some  degree  of  similarity,  and  that  it  is  possible  to  confirm  that 
something has been learned. (That is why it is difficult to learn from rare events.) The 
effect of learning is that behaviours change so that some outcomes become more likely 
and others less likely. If there is no change in behaviour, then probably nothing has been 
learned. And if the changes go in the wrong direction, then the wrong lessons have been 
learned. 
In learning from experience it is important to separate what is easy to learn from what is 
meaningful  to learn. Compiling extensive accident statistics or populating data bases is 
not the same as learning. In fact, since the number of things that go right, including near 
misses, is many orders of magnitudes larger than the number of things that go wrong, it 
makes sense to try to learn from the former as well as the latter. 
How Resilient Is Your Organisation?
Since resilience is defined by the organisation’s ability to adjust its functioning to expected 
and unexpected conditions, a resilience ‘measure’ will be different from traditional measures 
of safety. And because resilience refers to something that the organisation does rather than to 
something  that  it  has,  it  is  not  possible  to  represent  resilience  by  a  single  or  simple 
measurement.  The  solution  is  to  assess  each  of  the  four  abilities  that  together  define 
resilience.  This  can  by  done  by  means  of  a  Resilience  Analysis  Grid,  i.e.,  four  sets  of 
questions where the answers can be used to construct a resilience profile. 
The  detailed  assessment  of  the  four  abilities  requires  some  competence  in  resilience 
engineering and safety management, but mostly a good knowledge of how the organisation 
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operates. The starting point for the assessment is four sets of generic questions, which, of 
course, must be tailored to address the specifics of the target organisation. Since a detailed 
assessment  does  require  some  effort,  it  may  be  useful  to  begin  by  considering  the  four 
abilities  ‘wholesale,’  and  to  rate  them  using  the  categories  of  <excellent  |  satisfactory  | 
acceptable | unacceptable | deficient | missing>, for example. 
When giving the answers, it is essential to keep in mind that the purpose is to rate the 
typical way in which the organisation works rather than to ‘score’ recent accidents and 
incidents. The rating should describe how well the organisation normally is able to do 
something, rather than how badly things can turn out. 
Overall Assessment of the Organisation’s Degree of Resilience
By way of illustration,  the four main abilities  can be evaluated  using the following brief 
questionnaire. 
The ability to respond: How ready is the organisation to respond and how able (quickly and efficiently) is it to 
respond when something unexpected happens?
Excellent Satisfactory Acceptable Unacceptable Deficient Missing
The rating of this ability can be helped by asking some more detailed questions, for instance:
• How complete is the set of events for which the organisation is ready to respond?
• How fast can a response be given and how long can it be sustained?
• How is the readiness to respond ensured and maintained?
The ability to monitor: How well is the organisation able to detect smaller or larger changes to work conditions 
(internal and/or external) that may affect the organisation’s ability to carry out current or intended operations?
Excellent Satisfactory Acceptable Unacceptable Deficient Missing
The rating of this ability can be helped by asking some more detailed questions, for instance: 
• How does the organisation monitor the situation and how are the indicators defined?
• How is the validity of the indicators established?
• How are the ‘readings’ used and communicated?
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The ability to anticipate: How large an effort does the organisation put into what may happen in the near 
future? Is anticipation a strategic concern?
Excellent Satisfactory Acceptable Unacceptable Deficient Missing
The rating of this ability can be helped by asking some more detailed questions, for instance: 
• How does the organisation (or people in charge) think about the future? What is the 
‘model of the future’ that the organisation uses?
• How long is the organisation’s time horizon (for instance, number of years)?
• How is the cost-benefit of investments in the future established?
The ability to learn: How well does the organisation make use of formal and informal opportunities to learn from 
what happened in the past?
Excellent Satisfactory Acceptable Unacceptable Deficient Missing
The rating of this ability can be helped by asking some more detailed questions, for instance: 
• How selective is the basis for learning? Does the organisation consider both failures 
and successes?
• How often does the organisation try to learn? Continuously or when something has 
happened?
• How is learning expressed? (rules, procedures, attitudes, skills, etc.)?
Balancing the Four Abilities
The four basic abilities are represented symbolically in Figure 1.
Figure 1: The four abilities of a resilient organisation
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Resilience  Engineering  cannot  prescribe  a  certain  balance  or  proportion  among  the  four 
qualities. For a fire brigade, for instance, it is more important to be able to respond to the 
actual than to consider the potential,  while for a sales organisation the ability to anticipate 
may  be  just  as  important  as  the  ability  to  respond.  But  it  is  clearly  necessary  for  any 
organisation to address each of these qualities to some extent in order to be resilient.  All 
organisations traditionally put some effort into the ability to respond to the actual. Many also 
put some effort into the ability to learn from the factual, although often in a very stereotypical 
manner. Fewer organisations make a sustained effort to monitor the critical,  particularly if 
there has been a long period of stability. And very few organisations put any serious effort 
into the ability to anticipate the potential. 
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